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Abstract: This article examines developments regarding encryption law and policy within ‘Five
Eyes’ (FVEY) countries by focussing on the recently enacted Telecommunications and Other
Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018 (Cth) in Australia. The legislation is
significant both domestically and internationally because of its extraterritorial reach, allowing
the development of new ways for Australian law enforcement and security agencies to access
encrypted telecommunications  via  transnational  designated communications  providers,  and
allowing  for  Australian  authorities  to  assist  foreign  counterparts  in  both  enforcing  and
potentially circumventing their domestic laws. We argue that Australia is the ‘weak link’ in the
FVEY alliance as - unlike other FVEY members - has no comprehensive enforceable human
rights protections. Given this, there is a possibility for regulatory arbitrage in exploiting these
new surveillance powers to undermine encryption via Australia.
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This paper is part of Geopolitics, jurisdiction and surveillance, a special issue of Internet Policy
Review guest-edited by Monique Mann and Angela Daly.
INTRODUCTION
Since the Snowden revelations in 2013 (see e.g., Lyon, 2014; Lyon, 2015) an ongoing policy issue
has been the legitimate scope of surveillance, and the extent to which individuals and groups can
assert their fundamental rights, including privacy. There has been a renewed focus on policies
regarding  access  to  encrypted  communications,  which  are  part  of  a  longer  history  of  the
‘cryptowars’  of  the  1990s  (see  e.g.,  Koops,  1999).  We  examine  these  provisions  in  the
Anglophone  ‘Five  Eyes’  (FVEY)  1  countries  -  Australia,  Canada,  New Zealand,  the  United
Kingdom  and  the  United  States  (US)  -  with  a  focus  on  those  that  attempt  to  regulate
communications providers. The paper culminates with the first comparative analysis of recent
developments in Australia. The Australian developments are novel in the breadth of entities to
which they may apply and their extraterritorial reach: they attempt to regulate transnational
actors, and may implicate Australian agencies in the enforcement - and potential circumvention
- of foreign laws on behalf of foreign law enforcement agencies. This latter aspect represents a
significant and troubling development in the context of FVEY encryption-related assistance
provisions.
We explore this expansion of extraterritorial powers that extend the reach of all FVEY nations
via Australia, by requesting or coercing assistance from transnational technology companies as
“designated  communications  providers”,  and allowing  foreign  law enforcement  agencies  to
request their Australian counterparts to make such requests. Australia has unique domestic
legal arrangements, which includes an aggressive stance on mass surveillance (Molnar, 2017),
an absence of comprehensive constitutional or legislated fundamental rights at the federal level
(Daly & Thomas, 2017; Mann et al., 2018), and has recently enacted the Telecommunications
and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018  (Cth) 2, the focus of this
article. We demonstrate that Australia’s status as the ‘weak link’ in the FVEY alliance enables
the  introduction  of  laws  less  likely  to  be  constitutionally  or  otherwise  legally  permissible
elsewhere. We draw attention to the extraterritorial reach of the Australian provisions which
affords the possibility for other FVEY members to engage in regulatory arbitrage to exploit the
weaker human rights protections and oversight measures in Australia.
HUMAN RIGHTS AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN
AUSTRALIA
Australia has a well-documented track record of ‘hyper legislation’ of national security measures
(Roach, 2011), having passed over 64 anti-terrorism specific laws since 9/11 that have been
recognised as having serious potential to encroach democratic rights and freedoms (Williams &
Reynolds, 2017). Some of these laws have involved digital and information communications
infrastructures  and  their  operators,  such  as  those  facilitating  Australian  security  and  law
enforcement agencies’ use of Computer Network Operations (Molnar, Parsons, & Zouave, 2017)
and the introduction of  mandatory data retention obligations on internet service providers
(Suzor, Pappalardo, & McIntosh, 2017). Australia’s role as a leading proponent in advocating for
stronger powers against encrypted communications is consistent with this history.
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Yet, unlike any of the other FVEY members, Australia has no comprehensive enforceable human
rights protection at the federal level (Daly & Thomas, 2017; Mann et al., 2018). 3 Australia does
not have comprehensive constitutional rights (like the US and Canada), a legislated bill of rights
(like  NZ and the  UK) nor  recourse  to  regional  human rights  bodies  (like  the  UK and its
relationship with the European Convention on Human Rights) (Refer to Table 1).
Given this situation, we argue Australia is a ‘weak link’ among FVEY partners because its legal
framework allows for  a  more  vigorous  approach to  legislating  for  national  security  at  the
expense  of  human  rights  protections,  including  but  not  limited  to,  privacy  (Williams  &
Reynolds, 2017; Mann et al., 2018). Australia’s status as a human rights ‘weak link’ affords the
‘legal possibility’ for measures which may be ‘legally impossible’ in other jurisdictions, including
those of the other FVEY countries, given peculiar domestic and regional rights protections.
ENCRYPTION LAWS IN THE FIVE EYES
FVEY governments have made frequent statements regarding their  surveillance capabilities
‘going  dark’  due  to  encryption,  with  consequences  for  their  ability  to  prevent,  detect  and
investigate serious crimes such as terrorism and the dissemination of child exploitation material
(Comey,  2014).  This  is  despite  evidence  that  the  extensive  surveillance  powers  that  these
agencies maintain are mostly used for the investigation of drug offences (Wilson & Mann, 2017;
Parsons & Molnar, 2017). Further, there is an absence of evidence that undermining encryption
will improve law enforcement responses (Gill, Israel, & Parsons, 2018), coupled with disregard
for  the  many  legitimate  uses  of  encryption  (see  e.g.,  Abelson  et  al.,  2015),  including  the
protection of fundamental rights (see e.g., Froomkin, 2015).
It is important to note, as per Koops and Kosta (2018), that communications may be encrypted
by different actors at  different points  in the telecommunications process.  Where,  and who
applies encryption, will affect which actors have the ability to decrypt communications, and
accordingly where legal obligations to decrypt may lie, or be actioned. For example, in some
scenarios the service provider maintains the means of decrypting the communications, but this
would not be the case where the software provider or end user has the means to decrypt (i.e., ‘at
the ends’). More recently, the focus has shifted to communications providers offering encrypted
services or facilitating a third party offering such services over their networks. These actors can
be  forced to  decrypt  communications  either  via  ‘backdoors’  (i.e.,  deliberate  weaknesses  or
vulnerabilities) built into the service, or via legal obligations to provide assistance. The latter
scenario is not a technical backdoor per se, but could be conceptualised as a ‘legal’ means to
acquire a ‘backdoor’  as the government agency will  obtain covert access to the service and
communications therein, thus having a similar outcome to a technical backdoor. It is these
measures which are the focus of our analysis. We provide a brief overview of the legal situation
in each FVEY country (Table 1), before turning to Australia as our main focus.
UNITED STATES
The legal  situation in the US to compel decryption depends,  at  least  in part,  on the actor
targeted. The US has no specific legislation dealing with encryption although other laws on
government investigatory and surveillance powers may be applicable (Gonzalez, 2019). Forcing
an individual to decrypt data or communications has generally been considered incompatible
with the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution (i.e. the right against self-incrimination),
although  there  is  no  authoritative  Supreme  Court  decision  on  the  issue  (Gill,  2018).
Furthermore,  the  US government  may be impeded by arguments  that  encryption software
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constitutes ‘speech’ protected by the First Amendment and Fourth Amendment (Cook Barr,
2016; Gonzalez, 2019; see also Daly, 2017).
For communications providers, the US has a provision in the Communications Assistance for
Law Enforcement  Act  (CALEA) §1002  on Capability  Requirements  for  telecommunications
providers,  which  states  that  providers  will  not  be  required  to  decrypt  or  ensure  that  the
government  can decrypt  communications  encrypted by  customers,  unless  the  provider  has
provided the encryption used (see e.g., Koops & Kosta, 2018). 4
In  an  attempt  to  avoid  the  difficulty  of  forcing  individuals  to  decrypt,  and  the  CALEA
requirements’ application only to telecommunications companies, attention has been turned to
technology companies,  including equipment providers.  Litigation has been initiated against
companies that refuse to provide assistance; the most notable being the FBI-Apple dispute
concerning  the  locked  iPhone  of  one  of  the  San  Bernardino  shooters  (Gonzalez,  2019).
Ultimately the FBI were able to unlock the iPhone without Apple’s assistance, by relying on a
technical  solution  from Cellebrite  (Brewster,  2018),  thereby  engaging  in  a  form of  ‘lawful
hacking’ (Gonzalez, 2019). Absent a superior court’s ruling, or legislative intervention, the legal
position regarding compelled assistance remains uncertain (Abraha, 2019).
CANADA
Canada  does  not  have  specific  legislation  that  provides  authorities  the  power  to  compel
decryption.  Canadian  authorities  have  imposed  requirements  on  wireless  communications
providers  through  spectrum  licensing  conditions  in  the  form  of  the  Solicitor  General
Enforcement Standards for Lawful Interception of Telecommunications (SGES) Standard 12
which obliges providers to decrypt any communications they have encrypted on receiving a
lawful request, but excludes end-to-end encryption “that can be employed without the service
provider’s knowledge” (Gill, Israel, & Parsons, 2018, p. 59; West & Forcese, 2020). It appears
the requirements only apply to encryption applied by the operator itself, can involve a bulk
rather than case-by-case decryption requirement, do not require the operator to develop “new
capabilities to decrypt communications they do not otherwise have the ability to decrypt”, and
do not prevent operators employing end-to-end encryption (Gill, Israel, & Parsons, 2018, p. 60;
West & Forcese, 2020).
There are provisions of the Canadian Criminal Code which give operators immunity from civil
and criminal  liability  if  they cooperate with law enforcement ‘voluntarily’  by preserving or
disclosing data to law enforcement, even without a warrant (Gill, Israel, & Parsons, 2018, p. 57).
There are also production orders and assistance orders that can be issued under the Criminal
Code to oblige third parties to assist law enforcement, and disclose documents and records
which could, in theory, be used to target encrypted communications (Gill, Israel, & Parsons,
2018, pp. 62-63), but West and Forcese (2020, p. 13) cast doubt on this possibility. There are
also practical limitations, including the fact that many digital platforms and service providers do
not have a physical presence in Canada, and thus are effectively beyond the jurisdiction of
Canadian authorities (West & Forcese, 2020). Here, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLATs)
could be used, although their use is notoriously beset with delay, and may only be effective if the
other jurisdiction has its own laws to oblige third parties to decrypt data or communications
(West & Forcese, 2020).
The Canadian Charter  of  Rights  and Freedoms has  a  number of  sections  relevant  to  how
undermining encryption can interfere with democratic freedoms, namely sections 2 (freedom of
expression), 7 (security of the person), 8 (right against unreasonable search and seizure), and
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the right to silence and protection from self-incrimination contained in sections 7, 11 and 14
(West & Forcese, 2020). Case law from Canadian courts suggests that individuals cannot be
compelled  to  decrypt  their  own  data  (Gill,  2018,  p.  451).  The  Charter  implications  of
BlackBerry’s assistance to the Canadian police in the R v Mirarchi 5 case was never ruled on as
the case was dropped (Gill, Israel, & Parsons, 2018, p. 58).
In absence of a legislative proposal before the Canadian Parliament, it is difficult to surmise
how, and whether, anti-encryption powers would run up against human rights protections. Yet
any concrete proposal would likely face scrutiny in the courts given the impacts on Canadians’
Charter-protected rights.
NEW ZEALAND
In New Zealand, provisions in the Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security)
Act 2013 (TISCA) require network operators to ensure that their networks can be technically
subjected  to  lawful  interception  (Cooper,  2018).  6  Section  10(3)  requires  that  public
telecommunications network operators, on receipt of a lawful request, must decrypt encrypted
communications carried by its network, if that operator has provided the means of encryption.
Subsection 10(4) states that an operator is not required to decrypt communications that have
been encrypted using a publicly available product supplied by another entity, and the operator is
not  under  any  obligation  to  ensure  that  a  surveillance  agency  has  the  ability  to  decrypt
communications.
It appears these provisions may entail that an operator cannot provide end-to-end encryption
on its services so that their networks can be subject to lawful interception - that is, they must
maintain the cryptographic key where encryption is managed centrally by the service provider
(Global  Partners  Digital,  n.d.)  and engineer  a  ‘back door’  into  the  service  (Cooper,  2018).
However,  NGO NZ  Council  for  Civil  Liberties  considered  the  impact  of  this  provision  is
theoretical as most services are offshore, and this provision does not apply extraterritorially
(Beagle,  2017).  Yet,  section 38 of  TICSA allows the  responsible  minister  to  make “service
providers” (discussed below) subject to provisions such as this on the same basis as “network
operators”, which may involve section 10 having an extraterritorial reach (Keith, 2020).
There is a further provision in section 24 of TISCA that places both network operators and
service  providers  (defined  as  anyone,  whether  in  New  Zealand  or  not,  who  provides  a
communications  service  to  an  end  user  in  New  Zealand)  under  obligations  to  provide
‘reasonable’ assistance to surveillance agencies with interception warrants or lawful interception
authorities,  including the decryption of communications, when they were the source of the
encryption. Such companies do not have to decrypt encryption they have not provided nor
“ensure that a surveillance agency has the ability to decrypt any telecommunication” (TICSA s
24(4)(b)). It is unclear what “reasonable assistance” entails, and how that would apply to third
party app providers such as WhatsApp (to which section 24 would prima facie apply but not
section 10 in the absence of a section 38 decision). It is also unclear how this provision would be
enforced against offshore companies (Dizon et al., 2019, pp. 74-75).
There are further provisions in the Search and Surveillance Act 2012 which affect encryption.
Section 130 includes a requirement that “the user, owner, or provider of a computer system […]
offer  reasonable  assistance  to  law  enforcement  officers  conducting  a  search  and  seizure
including providing access information” which could be used to force an individual or business
to decrypt data and communications (Dizon et al., 2019, p. 61). There is a lack of clarity as to
how the privilege against self-incrimination operates (Dizon et al., 2019, pp. 62-63). There is
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also a lack of clarity about what “reasonable assistance” from companies, which will likely be
third parties, and not able to avail themselves of the protection against self-incrimination, may
entail (Dizon et al., 2019, pp. 65-66).
New Zealand has human rights protections enshrined in its Bill of Rights Act 1990, and section
21 contains the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, it “does
not have higher law status and so can be overridden by contrary legislation…but there is at least
some effort to avoid inconsistencies” (Keith, 2020). There is also the privilege against self-
incrimination, “the strongest safeguard available in relation to encryption as it works to prevent
a person from being punished for refusing to provide information that could lead to criminal
liability” (Dizon et al., 2019, p. 7). There is no freestanding right to privacy in the New Zealand
Bill of Rights, and so aspects of privacy must be found via other recognised rights (Butler, 2013),
or may be protected via data protection legislation and New Zealand courts’ “relatively strong
approach to unincorporated treaties, including human rights obligations” (Keith, 2020).
Despite being part of the FVEY communiques on encryption mentioned below, Keith (2020)
views New Zealand’s domestic approach as more “cautious or ambivalent”, with “no proposal to
follow legislation enacted by other Five Eyes countries”.
UNITED KINGDOM
The most significant law is the UK’s Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (henceforth IPA). 7 Section
253 allows a government minister, subject to approval by a 'Judicial Commissioner', to issue a
‘Technical  Capability  Notice’  (TCN)  to  any  communications  operator  (which  includes
telecommunications  companies,  internet  service  providers,  email  providers,  social  media
platforms, cloud providers and other ‘over-the-top’ services), whether UK-based or anywhere
else in the world, imposing obligations on that provider. Such an obligation can include the
operator having to remove “electronic protection applied by or on behalf of that operator to any
communications or data”. The government minister must also consider technical practicalities
such as whether it is ‘practicable’ to impose requirements on operators, and for the operators to
comply.  Section  254  provides  that  Judicial  Commissioners  conduct  a  necessity  and
proportionality test before approving a TCN. This means that a provider receiving a TCN would
not be able to provide end-to-end encryption for its customers, and must ensure there is a
method of decrypting communications. In other words, the provider must centrally manage
encryption and maintain the decryption key (Smith, 2017a).
In November 2017, the UK Home Office released a Draft Communications Data Code of Practice
for consultation, which clarified that a TCN would not require a telecommunications operator to
remove encryption per se, but “it requires that operator to maintain the capability to remove
encryption when subsequently served with a warrant, notice or authorisation” (UK Home Office,
2017, p. 75). Furthermore, it was reiterated that an obligation to remove encryption can only be
imposed where “reasonably practicable” for the communications provider to comply with, and
the  obligation  can only  pertain  to  encryption that  the  communications  provider  has  itself
applied, or in circumstances when this has been done, for example, by a contractor on the
provider’s behalf.
Later,  in  early  2018,  after  analysing  responses  to  the  Draft  Code,  the  UK  Home  Office
introduced draft administrative regulations to the UK Parliament, which were passed in March
2018. These regulations affirm the Home Office’s previous statements that TCNs require that
operators  “maintain  the  capacity”  to  disclose  communications  data  on  receipt  of  an
authorisation or warrant, and such notices can only impose obligations on telecommunications
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providers to remove “electronic protection” applied by, or on behalf of, the provider “where
reasonably practicable” (Ni Loideain, 2019, p. 186). This would seem to entail that encryption
methods applied by the user are not covered by this provision (Smith, 2017b). However, Keenan
(2019) argues that the regulations may “compel […] operators to facilitate the ‘disclosure’ of
content by targeting authentication functions” which may have the effect of secretly delivering
messages to law enforcement.
While  some of  the  issues  identified  above  with  the  UK’s  TCNs may be  clarified  by  these
regulations, other issues remain. For example, the situation remains unclear for a provider
wanting to offer end-to-end encryption to its customers without holding the means to decrypt
them. Practical questions remain about how the provisions can be enforced against providers
which may not be geographically based in the UK, such as technology companies and platforms
which may or may not maintain offices in the UK. To date, there is also no public knowledge of
whether any TCNs have been made, approved by Judicial Commissioners, and complied with by
operators (Keenan, 2019).
In addition to TCNs, section 49 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (2000) (RIPA)
allows law enforcement agencies in possession of a device to issue a notice to the device user or
device manufacturer to compel them to unlock encrypted devices or networks (Keenan, 2019).
The law enforcement officer must obtain permission from a judge on the grounds that it is
“necessary in the interests of national security, for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime,
or where it is in the interest of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom” (Keenan, 2019).
Case law on section 49 notices in criminal matters has generally not found the provision’s use to
force decryption to violate the privilege against self-incrimination, in sharp distinction to the US
experience (Keenan, 2019).
It is unclear whether these provisions would withstand such a challenge before the European
Court of Human Rights on the basis of incompatibility with ECHR rights, especially Article 6
(right to a fair trial) and Article 8 (right to privacy).
AUSTRALIA
In  Australia  the  encryption  debate  commenced in  June  2017  when then-Australian  Prime
Minister Turnbull (in)famously stated that “the laws of mathematics are very commendable, but
the only law that applies in Australia is the law of Australia” (Pearce, 2017, para. 8).  This
remark, interpreted colloquially as a ‘war on maths’ (Pearce, 2017), gestured at an impending
legislative proposal that would introduce provisions to weaken end-to-end encryption.
In August 2018, the Five Eyes Alliance met in a ‘Five Country Ministerial’ (FCM) and issued a
communique that stated: “ We agreed to the urgent need for law enforcement to gain targeted
access  to  data,  subject  to  strict  safeguards,  legal  limitations,  and  respective  domestic
consultations”  (Australian  Government  Department  of  Home Affairs,  2018,  para.  18).  The
communique  was  accompanied  by  a  Statement  of  Principles  on  Access  to  Evidence  and
Encryption, assented to by all FVEY governments (Australian Government Department of Home
Affairs, 2018). The statement affirmed the important but non-absolute nature of privacy, and
signalled  a  “pressing  international  concern”  posed  by  law  enforcement  inability  to  access
encrypted content. FVEY partners also agreed to abide by three principles in the statement:
mutual responsibility; the paramount status of rule of law and due process; and freedom of
choice for lawful access solutions. “Mutual responsibility” relates to industry stakeholders being
responsible for providing access to communications data. The “freedom of choice” principle
relates to FVEY members encouraging service providers to “voluntarily establish lawful access
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solutions to their products and services that they create or operate in our countries”, with the
possibility of governments “pursu[ing] technological, enforcement, legislative or other measures
to achieve lawful access solutions” if they “continue to encounter impediments to lawful access
to information” (Australian Government Department of Home Affairs, 2018, paras. 34-35).
In the month following this meeting, the Australian government introduced what became the
Telecommunications  and Other  Legislation Amendment  (Assistance  and Access)  Act  2018
(Cth) (or ‘AA Act’), which was subsequently passed by the Australian Parliament in December
2018.  The  Act  amends  pre-existing  surveillance  legislation  in  Australia,  including  the
Telecommunications Act 1997  (Cth) and the Telecommunications (Interception and Access)
Act  1979  (Cth).  It  includes a  series  of  problematic  reforms that  have extraterritorial  reach
beyond the Australian jurisdiction. 8
Specifically, three new mechanisms which seem (at least at face value) to be inspired by the UK’s
IPA are introduced into the Telecommunications Act: Technical Assistance Requests (TARs), 9
Technical Assistance Notices (TANs) 10 and Technical Capability Notices (TCNs). 11 TARs can be
issued by Australian security agencies 12 that may “ask the provider to do acts or things on a
voluntary basis that are directed towards ensuring that the provider is capable of giving certain
types of help.” 13 TARs escalate to TANs compelling assistance and impose penalties for non-
compliance.  The Australian Attorney-General  can also  issue TCNs which “may require  the
provider to do acts or things directed towards ensuring that the provider is capable of giving
certain types of help” or to actually do such acts and things.
While the language of TCN is similar to the UK IPA, there is a much longer and more broadly
worded list  of  “acts or things” that a provider can be asked to do on receipt of  a TCN. 14
Although, as per section 317ZG, “systemic weaknesses” cannot be introduced, 15 there is still a
significant  potential  impact  on  the  security  and privacy  of  encrypted  communications.  An
important distinction between Australian and the UK TCNs is that the Australian notices are
issued by the executive and are not subject to judicial oversight (Table 1).
The AA Act  has  extraterritorial  reach beyond Australia  in  two main ways.  The first  is  via
obligations  imposed  on  “designated  communications  providers”  located  outside  Australia.
“Designated communications providers” is  defined extremely broadly to include,  inter alia,
carriers,  carriage service providers,  intermediaries  and ancillary service providers,  and any
provider of an “electronic service” with any end-users in Australia, or of software likely to be
used in connection with such a service, that has any end-users in Australia. It includes any
“constitutional corporation” 16 that manufactures, installs, maintains or supplies devices for use,
or likely to be used, in Australia, or develops, supplies or updates software that is capable of
being installed on a computer or device that is likely to be connected to a telecommunications
network in Australia (Ford & Mann, 2019). Thus a very wide range of providers from Australia
and overseas will fall within these definitions (McGarrity & Hardy, 2020). Failure to comply
with  notices  may result  in  financial  penalties  for  companies,  yet  it  is  not  clear  how such
penalties  may  be  enforced  vis-à-vis  companies  which  are  not  incorporated  or  located  in
Australia.  In  any  case  in  which  a  TAR is  issued,  it  provides  designated  communications
providers with civil immunity 9 from damages that may arise from the request (for example,
rendering phones or devices useless), which may incentivise compliance prior to escalation to an
enforceable TAN or TCN (Ford & Mann, 2019).
The  second aspect  of  the  AA Act’s  extraterritorial  reach  is  the  provision  of  assistance  by
Australian law enforcement to their counterparts via the enforcement of foreign laws. The TARs,
TANs, and TCNs all involve “assisting the enforcement of the criminal laws of a foreign country,
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so far as those laws relate to serious foreign offences”. 17  This is also reinforced by further
amendments to the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987  (Cth) that bypass MLAT
processes, and provide a conduit to the extraterritorial application of Australia’s surveillance
laws.  That  is,  Australian  law enforcement  agencies  are  able  to  assist  foreign governments
through their requests for Australian assistance, including in the form of accessing encrypted
communications  and/or  designing  new  ways  to  access  encrypted  communications  (as  per
TCNs),  for the enforcement of  their  own criminal  laws.  18  This may operate as a loophole
through which foreign law enforcement agencies circumvent their own legal system’s safeguards
and capitalise on Australia’s lack of a federal human rights framework (Ford & Mann, 2019).
Table 1: Overview of anti-encryption measures in each FVEY country
 United States Canada New Zealand United
Kingdom
Australia
Relevant law/s Communications
Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act
§ 1002.
No specific
legislation that
provides authorities
the power to compel
decryption.
Narrow obligation in
Solicitor General
Enforcement
Standards for
Lawful Interception
of
Telecommunications
(SGES) Standard 12.
Telecommunications
(Interception
Capability and
Security) Act 2013
sections 10 and 24.
Investigatory
Powers Act 2016
section 253.
Telecommunications
and Other
Legislation
Amendment
(Assistance and
Access) Act 2018
(Cth) section 317A.
Entities
targeted
Application only to
“telecommunications
companies.”
Application only to
“wireless
communication
providers.”
Section 10 applies to
“network operators”
and section 24
applies to “network
operators” and
“service providers”.
Any
“communications
operator” (which
includes
telecoms
companies,
internet service
providers, email
providers, social
media platforms,
cloud providers
and other ‘over-
the-top’
services).
The definition of
“designated
communications
provider” is set out
in section 317C. It
includes but is not
limited to “a carrier
or carriage service
provider”, “person
provides an
electronic service
that has one or more
end-users in
Australia”, or “the
person
manufactures or
supplies customer
equipment for use,
or likely to be used,
in Australia”.
Regulatory arbitrage and transnational surveillance: Australia’s extraterritorial assistance
to access encrypted communications
Internet Policy Review | http://policyreview.info 10 September 2020 | Volume 9 | Issue 3
 United States Canada New Zealand United
Kingdom
Australia
Statutory
obligations
imposed on
target
Companies will not
be required to
decrypt or ensure
that the government
can decrypt
communications
encrypted by
customers, unless
the provider itself
has provided the
encryption used.
Providers must
decrypt any
communications
they have encrypted
themselves on
receiving a lawful
request. Seems not
to apply to end-to-
end encryption not
applied by the
provider.
Operators, on the
receipt of a lawful
request to provide
interception, must
decrypt encrypted
communications
carried by its
network, if that
operator has
provided the means
of encryption (s 10).
Operators and
providers must
provide “reasonable”
assistance to
surveillance
agencies with
interception
warrants or lawful
interception
authorities,
including the
decryption of
communications
when they have
provided the
encryption (s 24).
Operators
obliged to do
certain things
which can
include the
removal of
“electronic
protection
applied by or on
behalf of that
operator to any
communications
or data”. It is
unclear whether
a provider
receiving a TCN
would be able
provide end-to-
end encryption
for its customers.
Providers may be
issued with
Technical Assistance
Requests (TARs),
Technical Assistance
Notices (TANs)
and/or Technical
Capability Notices
(TCNs). TARs can be
issued by Australian
security agencies
that may “ask the
provider to do acts
or things on a
voluntary basis that
are directed towards
ensuring that the
provider is capable
of giving certain
types of help.” TARs
escalate to TANs
compelling
assistance and
impose penalties for
non-compliance.
The Australian
Attorney-General
can also issue TCNs
which “may require
the provider to do
acts or things
directed towards
ensuring that the
provider is capable
of giving certain
types of help” or to
actually do such acts
and things.
Human rights
protections
US Constitution,
notably the Fourth
and Fifth
Amendment. Also,
First Amendment in
terms of
cryptographic code
as a possible form of
protected free
speech.
Canadian Charter of
Rights and
Freedoms: Section 2
(freedom of
expression), Section
7 (security of the
person), Section 8
(right against
unreasonable search
and seizure), and the
right to silence and
protection from self-
incrimination
contained in
sections 7, 11 and 14.
Human Rights Act
1993.
Human Rights
Act 1998,
European
Convention on
Human Rights.
No comprehensive
protection at the
federal level; no
right to privacy in
Australian
Constitution.
Approval
mechanisms
for encryption
powers’
exercise
N/A Minister of Public
Safety (executive
branch).
Powers subject to
interception
warrants or other
lawful interception
authority. “Indirect”
judicial supervision
(Keith, 2020).
Approval by
Judicial
Commissioner.
Approval by
administrative or
executive officer
(TCNs are approved
by the Attorney-
General). If a
warrant or
authorisation was
previously required
for the activity, it is
still required after
these reforms.
Extraterritorial
application
Does not apply
extraterritorially
Does not apply
extraterritorially.
Section 10 does not
apply
extraterritorially
unless section 38
decision made.
Section 24 applies to
both NZ providers
and foreign
providers providing
a service to any end-
user in NZ.
Applies to both
UK-based and
foreign-based
communications
operators.
Applies to both
Australian and
foreign-based
providers.
Providers can
receive notices to
assist with the
enforcement of
foreign criminal
laws.
Relevant court
cases
Apple-FBI R v Mirarchi None known. None known. Not applicable.
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DISCUSSION
The recent legislative developments in Australia position it as a leading actor in the ongoing
calls for a broader set of measures to weaken or undermine encryption. The AA Act introduces
wide powers  for  Australian law enforcement  and security  agencies  to  request,  or  mandate
assistance in, communications interception from a wide category of communications providers,
internet  and  equipment  companies,  both  in  Australia  and  overseas,  and  permits  foreign
agencies to make requests to Australian agencies to use these powers in the enforcement of
foreign laws. Compared to the other FVEY jurisdictions’ laws in Table 1, the AA Act’s provisions
cover  the  broadest  category  of  providers  and  companies,  to  do  the  broadest  category  of
assistance acts, with the weakest oversight mechanisms and no protections for human rights.
Australia’s AA Act  also gives these provisions the most broad and significant extraterritorial
reach of the FVEY equivalent. While New Zealand and the UK also extend their assistance
obligations to foreign entities, Australia’s AA Act surpasses this to provide assistance to foreign
law enforcement agencies. This is a highly worrying development since the AA Act facilitates the
paradoxical enforcement (of criminal laws) and circumvention of (human rights) foreign laws
on behalf of foreign law enforcement agencies, through inter alia the coercion of transnational
technology companies into designing new ways of undermining encryption at a global scale via
Australian law in the form of TCNs.
The  idea  of  jurisdiction  shopping  by  FVEY  law  enforcement  agencies  may  be  applicable,
whereby Australia has enacted powers that have extraterritorial consequence, and that could
operate to serve the wider FVEY alliance, especially given the lack of judicial oversight of TCNs,
and Australia’s weak human rights protections. Jurisdiction shopping concerns the strategic
pursuance of legislative, policy and operational objectives in specific venues to achieve outcomes
that may not be possible in other venues due to the local context. 19
The AA Act provisions expand legally permissible extraterritorial measures to obtain encrypted
communications, and in theory, this enables FVEY partners to ‘jurisdiction shop’ to exploit the
lack of human rights protections in Australia. This is not the first time Australia has been an
attractive jurisdiction shopping destination. One previous example relates to Operation Artemis
run by the Queensland Police where a website used for the dissemination of child exploitation
material  was  relocated  to  Australian  servers  so  that  police  could  engage  in  a  controlled
operation  and commit  criminal  offences  (including  the  dissemination  of  child  exploitation
material) without criminal penalty (Høydal, Stangvik, & Hansen, 2017; McInnes, 2017). 20
Australia emerges as a strategic forum for FVEY partners to implement new laws and powers
with extraterritorial reach, as unlike other FVEY members, Australia has no meaningful human
rights protections that would prevent gross invasions arising from measures that undermine
encryption,  coupled  with  weak  oversight  mechanisms  (McGarrity  &  Hardy,  2020).  These
considerations also relate to the pre-existing use of ‘regulatory arbitrage’ by FVEY members,
which involves information being legally accessed and intercepted in one of the FVEY countries
with weaker human rights protection, then being transferred and used in other FVEY countries
with more restrictive legal frameworks (Citron & Pasquale, 2010). This situation may allow for
authorisation for extraterritorial data gathering to, in effect, be funnelled through the ‘weak link’
of Australia. Thus, the AA Act presents an opportunity for FVEY partners to engage in further
regulatory arbitrage by jurisdiction shopping their requests to access encrypted communications
and  to  mandate  designated  communications  providers  (i.e.  transnational  technology
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companies) design and develop new ways to access encrypted communications via Australia.
However, it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which the FVEY partners are indeed exploiting
the Australian ‘weak link’, for two reasons. One, the FVEY alliance operates in a highly secretive
manner. Second, the AA Act  severely restricts transparency, via the introduction of secrecy
provisions  and enhanced penalties  for  unauthorised disclosure,  and an absence  of  judicial
authorisation of the exercise of the powers (Table 1). There is very limited ex-post aggregated
public reporting of the exercise of the powers. One of these few mechanisms is the Australian
Department  of  Home  Affairs  annual  report  on  the  operation  of  the  Telecommunications
(Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth). The 2018-2019 report stated that seven TARs were
issued, five to the Australian Federal Police and two to the New South Wales Police. Cybercrime
and telecommunications offences were the two most common categories of crimes for which the
TARs were issued, with the notable absence of any terrorism offences - the main rationale
supporting the introduction of the powers. In the Australian Senate Estimates process in late
2019, it was revealed that the TAR powers had been used on a total of 25 occasions up to
November 2019 (Sadler, 2020a). 21 The fact that only TARs have been issued may indicate that
designated communications providers are complying with requests in the first instance, and
thus there is no need to escalate to enforceable notices.
One possible, and as yet unresolved, countervailing development to the AA Act in the FVEY
countries concerns the US introduction of the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD)
Act, which aims to facilitate US and foreign law enforcement access to data held by US-based
communications providers in criminal  investigations,  bypassing MLAT procedures (Abraha,
2019;  see  also  Gstrein,  2020,  this  issue;  Vazquez  Maymir,  2020,  this  issue).  Bilateral
negotiations regarding mechanisms for accessing (via US technology companies) and sharing e-
evidence under the CLOUD Act between the US and Australia are underway, and there have
been some early questions and debates (Bogle, 2019; Hendry, 2020) as to whether Australia will
comply with CLOUD requirements. Specifically, the CLOUD Act allows “foreign partners that
have robust protections for privacy and civil liberties to enter into executive agreements with the
United States to use their own legal authorities to access electronic evidence” (Department of
Justice, n.d) (PDF). CLOUD agreements between the US and foreign governments should not
include  any  obligations  forcing  communications  providers  to  maintain  data  decryption
capabilities nor should they include any obligation preventing providers from decrypting data. 22
It  is  uncertain  whether  Australia  would  comply  with  CLOUD  requirements  given  its
aforementioned weak human rights framework, and the absence of judicial oversight for the
authorisation of the anti-encryption powers.
These concerns seem to have motivated the current Australian opposition party,  Labor,  to
introduce a private member’s bill  into the Australian Parliament in late 2019 to ‘fix’  some
aspects of the AA Act, despite their bipartisan support in passage of the law at the end of 2018.
Notable  fixes  sought  include  the  introduction  of  enhanced  safeguards,  including  judicial
oversight and clarification that TARs, TANs, and TCNs cannot be used to force providers to
build  systemic  weaknesses  and vulnerabilities  in  their  systems,  including implementing  or
building  a  new decryption capability.  At  the  time of  writing,  the  Australian  Parliament  is
considering the bill, although it is unlikely it will be passed given the government has indicated
it will vote down Labor’s proposed amendments (Stadler, 2020b).
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CONCLUSION
Laws to restrict encryption occur in the context of regulatory arbitrage (Citron & Pasquale,
2010). This paper has analysed new powers that allow for Australian law enforcement and
security agencies to request or mandate assistance in accessing encrypted communications, and
permits foreign agencies to make requests to Australian agencies to use these powers in the
enforcement of foreign laws, taking advantage of a situation where there is less oversight and
fewer human rights or constitutional protections. The AA Act presents new opportunities for
FVEY  partners  to  leverage  access  to  (encrypted)  communications  via  Australia’s  ‘legal
backdoors’,  which may undermine protections that might otherwise exist  within local  legal
frameworks. This represents a troubling international development for privacy and information
security.
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FOOTNOTES
1. The FVEY partnership is a comprehensive intelligence alliance formed after the Second World
War, formalised under the UKUSA Agreement (see e.g., Mann & Daly, 2019).
2. Cth stands for Commonwealth, which means “federal” legislation, as distinct from state-level
legislation.
3. At the state and territory level: Victoria, Queensland and the Australian Capital Territory have
human rights laws, however the surveillance powers examined in this article are subject to
Commonwealth jurisidiction rendering so these state and territory based protections are
inapplicable. See: Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic); Human
Rights Act 2019 (QLD); Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT).
4. However, the draft EARN IT bill currently before the US Congress, if enacted, may impact
negatively upon providers’ ability to offer end-to-end encrypted messaging. See Pfefferkorn
(2020).
5. R v Mirarchi involved BlackBerry providing the Canadian police with a key which allowed
them to decrypt one million BlackBerry messages (Gill, Israel & Parsons, 2018, p. 57-58). The
legal basis and extent of BlackBerry’s assistance to the Canadian police was unclear from the
‘heavily redacted’ court records (West & Forcese, 2020).
6. For a full picture of New Zealand legal provisions which may affect encryption see Dizon et al.
(2019).
7. For additional provisions in UK law which may be relevant to encryption see Keenan (2019).
8. The analysis presented here focuses on Schedule 1 of the AA Act. Schedule 2 of the AA Act
introduces computer access warrants that allow law enforcement to covertly access and search
devices, and to conceal the fact that devices have been accessed.
9. a. b. S 317G.
10. S 317L.
11. S 317T.
12. Namely ‘the Director‑General of Security, the Director‑General of the Australian Secret
Intelligence Service, the Director‑General of the Australian Signals Directorate or the chief
officer of an interception agency’.
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13. Namely ‘ASIO, the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, the Australian Signals Directorate
or an interception agency’.
14. For example, “removing one or more forms of electronic protection that are or were applied
by, or on behalf of, the provider”, “installing, maintaining, testing or using software or
equipment” and “facilitating or assisting access to… a facility, customer equipment, electronic
services and software” are included in the list of ‘acts or things’ that a provider may be asked to
do via these provisions. The complete list of ‘acts or things’ are listed in section 317E
15. According to AA Act s 317B a systematic vulnerability means “a vulnerability that affects a
whole class of technology, but does not include a vulnerability that is selectively introduced to
one or more target technologies that are connected with a particular person” and a systematic
weakness means “a weakness that affects a whole class of technology, but does not include a
weakness that is selectively introduced to one or more target technologies that are connected
with a particular person.”
16. A category which, according to paragraph 51(xx) of the Australian Constitution, comprises
“foreign corporations, and trading or financial corporations formed within the limits of the
Commonwealth”.
17. S 317A; Table 1.
18. AA Act s 15CC(1); Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth) ss 27A(4) and (4)(a).
19. Analyses of policy venue shopping have been conducted in relation to a range of policy areas,
inter alia, immigration, environmental, labour, intellectual property, and rehabilitation policies
(see e.g., Ley, 2016; Holyoke, Brown, & Henig, 2012; Pralle, 2003; Zuan, Roos, & Gulzau, 2016;
Nagel, 2006; Murphy & Kellow, 2013). According to Pralle (2003, p. 233) a central “component
of any political strategy is finding a decision setting that offers the best prospects for reaching
one’s policy goals, an activity referred to as venue shopping”. Further, Murphy and Kellow
(2013, p. 139) argue that policy venue shopping may be a political strategy deployed at global
levels where “entrepreneurial actors take advantage of ‘strategic inconsistencies’ in the
characteristics of international policy arenas”.
20. A further example that demonstrates regulatory arbitrage between FVEY members from the
perspective of Canada, brought to light in 2013, involved Canada’s domestic security intelligence
service (CSIS) being found by the Federal Court to have ‘breached duty of candour’ by secretly
refusing to disclose their leveraging of FVEY networks when it applied for warrants during an
international terrorism investigation involving two Canadian suspects (Bell 2013).
21. It should be noted that due to the overlapping time frames and aggregated nature of
reporting, the 25 occasions the powers were used may also include some of the 7 occasions
reported in the most recent Home Affairs annual-report.
22. CLOUD Act s 105 (b) (3). Note: The US Department of Justice claims the CLOUD Act is
“encryption neutral” in that “neither does it prevent service providers from assisting in such
decryption, or prevent countries from addressing decryption requirements in their own
domestic laws.” (Department of Justice, n.d)
